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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we will discuss how competence
can affect a person’s ability to avoid avalanches
and present a way of modelling such competence.
Given that the prior probability of getting caught
in avalanches is fairly low for any skier (compe-
tent or not), we draw some consequences from
the model using Bayes’ theorem for “everyday” sit-
uations. The paper is structured as follows: in
section two, we highlight some basic assumptions
that motivate our model. In section three, we out-
line the specifics behind our model and, in section
four, present the results of our model. In section
five, we draw on Bayes’ theorem and apply it to
“everyday” scenarios. In the last section, we sum-
marise the general lessons to draw from the model
for avalanche education and decision-making in
avalanche terrain.
2. AVALANCHE PREDICTION: TESTING THE
TERRAIN
Available data suggests that it is fairly improba-
ble to get caught in an avalanche. In Switzerland
alone, for example, there are about 200 people
who get caught in an avalanche per year1 and the
death toll in Switzerland, Italy, Austria and France
is between 20 to 30 people per year per coun-
try.2 Overall, given the great number of skiers—ski
tourers and off-piste skiers—the probability of get-
⇤Corresponding author: Philip Ebert, Law and Philoso-
phy, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland; email:
philipebert@me.com
1Compare (Harvey and Zweifel, 2008b).
2Compare (Valt et al., 2009). This suggests a fatality rate
of roughly 1 in 10 people caught in an avalanche, compare
(Schweizer and Lütschg, 2001). See also (Brugger et al., 2007)
who present a fatality rate of 1 in 5 without so-called avalanche
airbags and 1 in 33 with such airbags. In contrast (Jamieson
et al., 2009) suggest a fatality rate of 1 in 100 in Canada.
These numbers are notoriously difficult to quantify, see again
(Jamieson et al., 2009).
ting caught in an avalanche seems not that high.3
Moreover, there is no denying that being a compe-
tent avalanche decision-maker—however far from
being a perfect predictor—will involve skills that
will help reduce this probability further. There is
much we can learn in avalanche courses and such
knowledge lowers the overall probability of get-
ting caught in an avalanche. In particular, guided
groups—involving professional mountain guides
with extensive training in avalanche safety—are
less likely to get avalanched.4 These observations
give rise to the following assumptions we will use
in our model:
1. Competent and incompetent decision-makers
are both subject to false positive judgements:
scenarios when they judge a slope to be safe,
yet they will get caught in an avalanche if they
cross it.
2. Being competent helps to reduce the number
of false positive judgements.
3. Irrespective of competence, the probability of
getting caught in an avalanche is fairly low for
any (non-reckless) skier.
Let us say a little more about how we un-
derstand the competences involved in predicting
avalanches. When we speak of an “incompetent”
decision-maker, we do not mean to imply that
he/she is a “reckless” skier who skis in any type of
condition. Rather, what we have in mind here with
“incompetent decision-maker” is a broadly compe-
tent skier—let’s call him Ingo—who at least con-
siders the basic avalanche warning issued by the
local avalanche forecasters. Nearly all mountain
3According to (Zweifel et al., 2006)—as presented in
(Jamieson et al., 2009)—the fatality rate is roughly 1:70,000
in an area around Davos. So using a rate of 1 in 10 fatali-
ties, there is a probability of getting caught in an avalanche of
around 1:7,000 per day per skier in the backcountry.
4See for example, (Harvey and Zweifel, 2008a) where this
claim is made.
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areas have an avalanche warning system which
rates the avalanche risk on a level from 1 (low)
to 5 (extreme). So, let’s assume that Ingo and
any so-called incompetent decision-maker has no
proper training for predicting avalanches, yet he
heeds these warnings and avoids backcountry ski-
ing on days when the warning is 4 (high risk) or 5
(extreme risk). Hence, the skier might reasonably
take himself to be careful and not reckless.5
In contrast let us introduce Connie, she is also
a competent skier who over a period of five years
takes part in extensive avalanche safety training.
She completes a number of courses, involving at
least a week of training. The skills she acquires
are multifarious: for example, she learns how to
prepare for her trips by reading detailed avalanche
forecasts; she learns how the wind and weather
can affect the stability of a slope depending on
aspect and exposure, and so on. Given these
skills, we can reasonably assume that based on
her 5 years of training and experience in how to
apply these new skills, her ability to predict un-
safe avalanche terrain has improved in contrast
to Ingo’s. After 5 years of training she decides
to stop improving her skills (we will assume that
the learning curve is linear and we assume that
Connie does not lose any competence after the
first 5 years).
The question we want to answer is the following:
Given that it is fairly improbable to get caught in
an avalanche in the first place, and given that the
skills that Connie learns will not guarantee that
she will not get avalanched, and given that it takes
time and experience to learn such skills, how do
these competences actually affect the probability
of getting avalanched over a longer period of time?
Before outlining the details of the model, we
want to highlight certain simplifications and draw
attention to our chosen methodology: First, we
focus only on the probability of getting caught in
an avalanche and ignore fatality rates. Second,
we ignore naturally triggered avalanches and fo-
cus only on specific cases where a skier triggers
an avalanche in which she is caught. Third, it
is worth emphasising an important aspect of our
methodology: we are not relying on confirmed
empirical data to estimate the values for com-
petence. Rather, our interest is, shall we say,
a philosophical one: we engage in a theoret-
ical exercise where we assume that a compe-
tent decision-maker has a certain probability of
getting caught in an avalanche over a ten year
5In fact ⇠81% of avalanche-fatalities occur when the level
is between 1-3. Compare (Zweifel, 2002). One way to interpret
this statistic is that many skiers heed these warnings and don’t
ski when the avalanche warning is high-risk or extreme.
period (1 in 28) which has empirical backing.6
We will then work back to what the probability for
an incompetent decision-maker will be, given our
assumptions—taken as rough estimates—about
how much avalanche safety training can affect the
reliability of a competent decision-maker. Hence,
in effect, our model is itself a prediction that is sub-
ject to confirmation or disconfirmation and subject
to further improvement given more data.
3. THE SEARCH: MODELLING COMPETENCE
IN AVALANCHE DECISION-MAKING
Our model uses the following four components
to calculate the probability of a competent and
incompetent decision-maker getting avalanched:7
Ski days per year We assume that a skier has
30 ski days in the backcountry a year. And so
we assume a total of 300 days for a ten year
model.
Avalanche warning We assume that skiers ski
at either avalanche warning 1, 2, or 3. We as-
sign different probabilities to the event that
an avalanche occurs depending on these
avalanche warnings.
Avalanche slope crossings We assume that a
skier has, on average, five avalanche slopes
that she/he crosses per day.
Competence A skier has a choice with respect
to the crossing of the avalanche slope which
can exhibit her or his competence. She can
decide that it is safe to cross, or she can
decide that it is unsafe to cross. The incom-
petent skier is modelled on the basis of no
specific competence—the analogy being that
of a coin-tosser crossing on, say heads, and
not crossing otherwise using a fair coin. The
competent skier’s competence rises over a
period of 5 years to what is, using the anal-
ogy, in effect a heavily biased coin.
6If there is roughly one avalanche fatality in 70,000 ski
touring days—compare (Zweifel et al., 2006)—and there is a
fatality rate of 1 in 10, we have a probability of getting caught in
an avalanche of about 1 in 7000. If we consider, as we do, 30
skiing days per year over 10 years, this suggest a probability of
1 in 23 of getting caught over that period. However, this statistic
does not individuate competent, incompetent or reckless skiing.
Yet, assuming that there are very few completely reckless
skiers, and mostly competent and incompetent backcountry
skiers, the assumption we make about competent decision-
maker seems appropriate. Compare here also (Kristensen
et al., 2012) where the probabilities used are overall lower—
importantly, the main results in section 5 will be even more
striking if the probabilities are lower than we assume! It is also
worth noting that there is a strong variability of the relevant risk
given other factors which we are ignoring—such as geography,
age group, etc.
7Some initial inspiration was drawn from (Tremper, 2008)
but there are crucial differences.
364
International Snow Science Workshop Grenoble – Chamonix Mont-Blanc - 2013
In our model, we first assign probabilities to the
risk of avalanche depending on “objective" fac-
tors that are captured in the avalanche warning
issued by local experts. So on a low avalanche
warning, we assign the probability 1 in 100,000 to
the event that a slope is disposed to avalanche.
The probability progressively increases as the
avalanche warning gets raised; we used factor
10 (see (Jamieson et al., 2009)). That is, on
avalanche warning 2 (moderate) we have 1 in
10,000 and, if it is considerable, we use 1 in 1,000.
We here assume that if a slope is disposed to
avalanche, a skier who crosses the slope, will
trigger an avalanche.
We modelled competence by having a skier
make a decision with respect to the slope. She has
a simple choice: she can either cross the slope or
decide not to cross it. The incompetent decision-
maker, who in our model is sufficiently competent
to actually identify a potential avalanche slope—
clearly a non-trivial assumption—is modelled sim-
ply as tossing a coin whether to cross the slope
or not cross the slope. In our model the compe-
tence function outputs a 0 (not crossing the slope)
or 1 (cross a possibly avalanche disposed slope),
which is then multiplied by the probability of the
slope being disposed, i.e. the “objective factors”,
to give the overall probability of getting caught
in an avalanche in that crossing. A more com-
petent decision-maker will more often make the
objectively right decision and thus be less likely to
cross a slope that is avalanche disposed. Hence,
in the competent case the function outputs more
0’s and fewer 1’s. In effect, the 0 output can be
interpreted not merely to stand for not cross but
also, in the case of the competent decision-maker
as standing for cross and the slope is correctly
judged not avalanche disposed—hence there is
zero probability to get avalanched. Importantly,
we here assume that both subjects have overall
the same level of risk-aversion (or risk-seeking) so
that the difference between crossing or not cross-
ing cannot simply be explained by different risk
attitudes; rather, the thought here is that it is in
virtue of the competences involved that the com-
petent decision-maker can reduce the number of
unsafe crossings.8
8In (Kristensen et al., 2012) different levels of risk aversion
are modelled. Using Munter’s risk reduction model (RM), see
(Munter, 2003), different fatality rates are assigned to skiers
with different levels of risk acceptance—however differences
between competence and incompetence are not modelled
there. In effect, one can view our model as relative to a specific
RM level. So one could vary the probability for an incompetent
skier to cross—set in our model simply as a 50-50 chance—as
(partly) dependent on the RM level the skier pertains to. The
point of our model would then be that given a specific value
for the incompetent decision-maker, the competent decision-
maker will have a more favourable value and will overall have
more safe crossings. We will leave this complication aside and
As mentioned before, the values we assign to
competence are not directly confirmed by empiri-
cal data. To the best of our knowledge there is no
such data available.9 The so-called incompetent
skier’s “competence” is, however, straightforwardly
assigned. Remember that we don’t simply assume
our incompetent skier, Ingo, to be silly or reckless
(he only skies on avalanche warning level 1-3) but
he has a choice to either ski or not ski a given
slope. Given that Ingo has no relevant skill, he is
given a 50-50 chance of crossing or not crossing.
On the other hand, the competent skier is as-
signed much better odds of getting it right. Our
competent skier, Connie, is modelled so that in
only 1 out of 5 choices, she is exposed to a non-
zero probability of getting caught in an avalanche.
So, the way we perceive competence is that it
manifests itself in making some crossings com-
pletely safe. That is, by exercising her compe-
tence, Connie manages to reduce the number of
unsafe choices from 5 out of 10 in Ingo’s case, to
2 out of 10 slopes. Later, we will also consider the
case of an expert—we call her Ezra—and in her
case competences further reduce her exposure to
a potential slide to only 1 out of 20 choices.
Given the type of training a competent person
has received we think these assumptions are not
unfounded; but, as mentioned before, empirical
data is needed to be more confident in our com-
petence values. Also, we have not yet taken
into account that competence could manifest it-
self in other situations—not merely in judging an
avalanche slope as safe. A competent skier might
ski with more foresight and take various mea-
sures that can help his survival chances, e.g. she
may “cut the slope”, i.e. intentionally trigger an
avalanche while being in a safe spot. Also we ig-
nore that incompetence can manifest itself by not
being able to identify a potentially dangerous slope
and thus have no choice whether to cross a given
slope. Sceptics of the competence values used
are invited to change the relevant values in our
model and see how more competences can have
an effect on the probability of getting avalanched
and, most importantly, use the relevant values in
our calculations in section 5.
4. PROBING: RESULTS OF THE MODEL
We modelled the cumulative risk of getting
caught in an avalanche for a competent and incom-
petent skier over a period of ten years (300 days).
deal with it in future research. We also ignore the observa-
tion that self-efficacy can in turn lead to a higher level of risk
acceptance. See e.g. in rock climbing (Llewellyn et al., 2008).
9It would be great to use the model of citizen science to col-
lect such data, e.g. in the form of apps that record backcountry
skiers’ exposure days, formal training and how often they get
caught in an avalanche.
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Figure 1: The cumulative risk of getting caught in an avalanche over 10 years for an incompetent and
competent decision-maker (left) and the associated risk ratios (right).
Figure 1 demonstrates the effects of increasing
competence.
The odds of an incompetent skier getting caught
is 1 in 15, or roughly 7 out of 100 incompetent
skiers (6.7%). The ratio of the respective cumu-
lative risk is 1.84 which means that the incompe-
tent decision-maker is nearly twice as likely to get
caught in an avalanche in that period compared to
the competent one. On our model while (roughly)
7 out 100 incompetent skiers get avalanched over
10 years, roughly 4 out of 100 competent skiers
(3.6%) get caught as well. The effects of com-
petence are pronounced but maybe not as pro-
nounced as one may have expected.
This, of course, raises an important question
about competence. Maybe we have underesti-
mated the effects of competence. So let’s con-
sider our third skier Ezra mentioned above. Sim-
ilar to Connie, Ezra is keen to learn more about
avalanches, and, like Connie, she learns a fair bit
over the first five years, but in contrast to Connie,
she continues to take advanced courses so that
her competences keep on developing further. So,
while her development over the first five years is
like Connie’s, over the next 5 years, she becomes
what we call an expert :10 in her case competences
further reduce her exposure to a potential slide to
only 1 out of 20 choices, in contrast to 10 out of
20 in Ingo’s case and 4 out of 20 in Connie’s case.
Figure 2 has the results for Ezra (high comp), Con-
nie (med comp), and Ingo (low comp).
1 in 32 experts (3.1%) will get caught in an
avalanche compared to 1 in 28 for the competent
one over a period of 10 years. It seems more
marked in contrast to the 1 in 15 for the incom-
10(Tremper, 2008) suggests that acquiring the relevant com-
petences will take up to 10 years of training in the case of an
expert.
petent decision-maker. So, while 4 out of 100
competent decision maker will get caught in an
avalanche, we have 3 out of 100 expert decision-
maker who will get caught (compared to 7 out of
100 incompetent skiers). Of course, we have to
remember that over the first five years the com-
petent and expert decision-maker have an equal
probability. Also note it is only after ten years, hav-
ing reached a very high level of competence, that
Ezra might reasonably be called an expert.11
It is worth remembering the practical limitation of
this model: until we have solid data to confirm our
competence values, the applicability of our model
is limited. Still, having this model in place, it is time
now to draw some more theoretical consequences
from it.
5. BAYES BEACON: BAYES’ THEOREM
In this section, we will investigate how our model
can affect or, rather, should affect a subject’s rea-
soning about competent or incompetent avalanche
decision-making. Using Bayes’ theorem, we hope
to shed light on how strongly certain pieces of evi-
dence (e.g. “having so far avoided avalanches”)
should affect a subject’s judgement. Naturally,
when making such normative claims—about how
one ought to reason—we make certain idealisa-
tions and assume that the notion of evidential sup-
11Thus, one may object that this graph doesn’t give the an-
swer to the question how probable it is that an expert decision-
maker will get avalanched; after all, we take the whole training
into account to become an expert. Fair enough: without taking
training into account the cumulative risk of getting caught in an
avalanche over 10 years being competent and being expert,
assuming no improvement or loss in their skills is: 3 in 100 for
the competent (or: 1 in 37) and 7 in 1000 for the expert (1 in
150). Given that experts do get avalanched (while admittedly
also spending a lot of time in the snow) the assigned value for
competence is very likely an upper limit.
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Figure 2: The cumulative risk of getting caught in an avalanche over 10 years for an incompetent,
competent and expert decision-maker (left) and the associated ratios of these risks (right).
port is best modelled in a standard probabilistic
framework. Nonetheless, we think the following
“real-life” scenarios have relevance and should be
taken into account in everyday decision-making
about avalanche safety.
Scenario 1
Imagine a skier, call him Alexander, who has skied
for 10 years. He has studied some books on
avalanche safety and has taken some courses, so
he has a fairly high degree of confidence that he
is competent (on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 being
certain that he is not competent, to 1 being certain
that he is competent, let’s say that Alexander con-
fidence is 0.8). Yet, after 10 years, he makes the
wrong call and gets caught in an avalanche that he
himself triggers.12 He is lucky and he survives the
slide. Aspiring to always be an ideal rational agent,
Alexander now considers what consequences to
draw from the event: Should Alexander change
his mind and consider himself as an incompetent
decision-maker given that he got caught in an
avalanche? Or, to put it in more academic slang:
Given Alexander’s prior confidence about his own
competence in avalanche decision-making, how
should the fact that he got caught in an avalanche
affect Alexander’s confidence about his compe-
tence?
Given our results, we can calculate how confi-
dent Alexander should be in his competence tak-
ing account of the new piece of evidence using
12This is important, we thereby assume here that there are
no other overriding reasons for Alexander to ignore the evi-
dence. For example, we ignore the case where he got caught
in an avalanche triggered by other skiers. We assume instead
that he did judge the slope as safe but it did avalanche; in that
sense he made the wrong call.
Bayes’ theorem. With C for that one is a com-
petent decision-maker, and L for that one got
avalanched after 10 years of skiing, and P (C|L)
for the probability that one is a competent decision-
maker given that one got caught in an avalanche
after 10 years of skiing we get:
P (C|L) = P (L|C)P (C)
P (L)
(1)
which is equivalent to:
P (C|L) = P (L|C)P (C)
P (L|C)P (C) + P (L|¬C)P (¬C) (2)
Assuming a fairly high degree of prior confidence
on Alexander’s part that he is competent (0.8) on
a scale from 0 to 1, we can calculate the updated
confidence that he is competent given he has been
caught in an avalanche using our model results,
i.e. P (L|C) = 0.036 and P (L|¬C) = 0.067.13
P (C|L) = (0.036) · (0.8)
(0.036) · (0.8) + (0.067) · (0.2) = 0.69
(3)
That is, the event of getting caught in an avalanche
should have some effect on the confidence that
one is competent but not as much as one might
anticipate. Alexander should still be reasonably
confident that he is competent (after all the de-
gree of confidence is still considerably greater than
13We are interpreting ¬C as “incompetent” as defined above
and read off the relevant data P (L|¬C) from the model for the
incompetent decision-maker. Strictly speaking, this is incorrect
since there are reckless skiers as well as experts that fall
under ¬C. We thus take the value as an approximation on
the assumption that nearly all backcountry skiers who are not
competent will be incompetent, as we defined it.
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0.5).14 The following situation highlights a different
aspect:
Scenario 2
You arrive at a new backcountry ski area and you
look for a ski partner. You don’t know how many
competent or incompetent decision-makers are
in the area. So, you are unprejudiced whether a
person is competent (or incompetent) and your
confidence is 0.5 that a skier is competent (or
incompetent).15 Given you want to ski fast, you
choose a ski partner who has at least 10 years
of experience.16 Having found a partner, you
ask her whether she has ever been caught in an
avalanche. Your partner tells you that she skied
for ten years and has never been caught in an
avalanche. How should this fact affect your confi-
dence that your potential partner is competent.
It’s time to draw on Bayes’ theorem again and
see how this information should change your con-
fidence that she is competent.
P (C|¬L) = P (¬L|C)P (C)
P (¬L|C)P (C) + P (¬L|¬C)P (¬C)
(4)
and with a prior probability of being perfectly
unprejudiced (the technical term is: indifferent),
i.e. 0.5, we get using again our model results
(P (¬L|C) = 0.96 and P (¬L|¬C) = 0.93):
P (C|¬L) = (0.96) · (0.5)
(0.96) · (0.5) + (0.93) · (0.5) = 0.508
(5)
As a result, that a person did not get caught in
an avalanche should not affect your judgement
very much at all. That is, if you are unpreju-
diced/indifferent about whether a person is com-
petent (0.5), receiving the information that she has
never been caught hardly provides any additional
evidence that she is competent (0.508) and you
should remain (very close to) indifferent upon re-
ceiving this new information. Hence, the fact that
a skier has never been caught in an avalanche
in a ten year period, provides nearly no evidence
to think that she is a competent decision-maker.
Figure 3 provides a matrix for scenario 1 (left) and
scenario 2 (right) and the effects of the relevant
evidence given different prior probabilities.
14One way to explain the change in attitude is to use bets:
prior to the incident, Alexander would have been justified to
take a bet with the odds of 4–1 against him being competent,
his updated credences (still) justify him to take a bet of 11–5
against him being competent.
15This assignment of priors follows from an application of
the principle of indifference and the assumption that all skiers
are either competent or incompetent.
16Importantly you don’t treat this as evidence for thinking
that the person is competent; just that they are fast skiers.
6.WIDENING THE (RE)SEARCH
We think the second scenario contains an im-
portant lesson for avalanche education and it is
worth considering in more detail. According to
the model, even though an incompetent decision-
maker is nearly twice as likely to get caught in an
avalanche, there is still a fairly low probability that
an incompetent person will get caught at all. As a
result, the fact that a skier didn’t get avalanched
provides hardly any evidence for whether she is
competent. Yet, all too often, one hears of people
speaking of experienced backcountry skiers, and
it is thereby suggested that the person is a com-
petent ski-tourer with the ability to safely negotiate
avalanche terrain. We regard the results of sce-
nario 2, to offer a warning not to treat experience,
or, more specifically, having successfully avoided
avalanches over 10 years, as significant evidence
for judging that person to be competent—based
on our model, it simply isn’t!
More worryingly, we also seem to have all the
required ingredients to generate an illusion of com-
petence: as is well-known and discussed widely
in popular psychology books17 humans often aim
to offer reasons and explanations why events hap-
pened, even if they are best regarded as random
events. So, if a skier manages to avoid avalanches
over a ten year period, there has to be, one might
be tempted to think, a good reason for it—it can’t
simply be by luck. And the illusion might become
even more extensive when judging one’s own his-
tory: I might be easily led to think that it must be for
good reason that I have avoided avalanches over
such a long period of time. That is, I must have de-
veloped a competence. What our model shows is
that one should really not be that surprised—from
a statistical point of view—that incompetent (yet
non-reckless) decision-makers manage to avoid
avalanches. We maintain that competent decision-
making is grounded in knowing how to minimise
risk, while simply having avoided bad outcomes
(even over a long time) is no guarantee of being
competent.
Hence, we want to draw attention to the fact
that although experience is necessary to develop
certain competences, that is, it is an enabling con-
dition to gain competences and know how to ap-
ply them, having experience, i.e. having been ex-
posed to the relevant risks and “got a way with it" is
itself no good evidence to having acquired these
competences. More generally, we want to cau-
tion against the inference that in most mountain
sports, experience is by itself a reliable indicator
of competence. Our model and the use of Bayes’
17See in particular (Kahneman, 2011) and (Chabris and
Simons, 2009); both books provided much inspiration for this
work.
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Figure 3: Prior confidence in competence (black) and updated confidence (red). Scenario 1 (left) and
scenario 2 (right).
Theorem is a way to substantiate this warning.18
In this context, it is worth drawing attention to the
following unwarranted inference from our model:
given that the probability for an incompetent skier
to get caught in an avalanche is so low, there is
no point in taking avalanche courses. However,
it is, firstly, worth remembering that we assumed
certain values for competence and more empirical
data is required to confirm our model. Hence, it
might well be that the difference between compe-
tence and incompetence is more pronounced than
we assume. Secondly, in our model, incompetent
decision-makers are nearly twice as likely to get
caught in an avalanche within the first 10 years.
This is surely relevant! And over a longer period of
time, this ratio will continue to go up. Competence,
therefore, manifests itself not within the first few
years; rather it manifests itself only over a longer
period of time and its effects will continuously be-
come more and more pronounced. So, the lesson
is instead that if you plan to ski into “old age",
and you plan to reduce the overall risk of getting
caught in an avalanche, the sooner you start in-
forming yourself about avalanche safety, the better
the odds will be in the long run when compared to
an incompetent decision-maker.19 Figure 4 shows
18See also the excellent article (McCammon, 2004) who
outlines a number of heuristic traps for avalanche decision-
making. Our paper can be seen as providing an explanation of
a potential further trap: that one is easily misled by an allusion
to experience to overestimate one’s own or other people’s
competences—it relates to what he calls expert halo trap.
19Of course the best way to avoid avalanches is not to go
backcountry-skiing at all; we here assume that this is not really
an option. For an article which aims to justify competent risk-
taking in mountain sports, see (Ebert and Robertson, 2013).
the cumulative risk of our three skiers over a 20
year period. It seems to us that the premium to
pay to gain competences is very low to effect such
significant change and thereby lower your future
risk which, we maintain, should be of relevance
to you now ; remember, about 1 in 10 people who
get caught in an avalanche do not survive.20
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1 Error in cumulative risk calculation
We found an error in the R-code underlying the cumulative risk calculation of triggering
an avalanche presenting in our article:
“Bayesian Beacon: Avalanche Prediction, Competence, and Evidence for Com-
petence, Modelling the E↵ect of Competent and Incompetent Predictions of
Highly Improbable Events.” Proceedings of the International Snow Science
Workshop, 2013, pp.363-370. http://arc.lib.montana.edu/snow-science/objects/
ISSW13 paper O5-04.pdf
Given numerous guesstimates and assumption the risk of triggering an avalanche was
calculated to be around 6.7% over 10 year for a non-competent decision and 3.6% for a
competent decision over the same period. In one line of the code, we made a mistake
when calculating the probability of getting avalanched on a given day for five di↵erent
slope crossings. This resulted in the stated risk to be significantly less than it should be.
Using the same assumptions as in our paper, the cumulative risk of triggering an avalanche
for a non-compentent decision maker are closer to 28% while a competent decision maker
will have a cumulative risk of 12% of triggering an avalanche over that period.
While this might seem more in line with intuitive expectation, it is important to
note that the main lessons from the paper, in particular that a track record of avalanche
avoidance alone is not a good indicator of competence, remains correct. After all, 72 out
of 100 non-competence decision makers will avoid triggering an avalanche, while 88 of
competent decision-makers avoid avalanches. According to Bayes’ Theorem, learning of
a person (who you assign a prior of 0.5 to be competent) that she has never been in an
avalanche over the relevant period increases your confidence that the person is competent
from 0.5 to 0.55, and so, as before, this evidence is not as strong as one may expect, when
judging competence of a decision-maker.
Rather than correcting the original model, we o↵er an alternative way to calculate the
cumulative risk of triggering an avalanche over a given period, assuming a certain number
of slope-crossings per day and avalanche risk per slope. In this model, these assumptions,
as well as the e↵ects of competence in reducing the avalanche risk, are easily adjusted and
readers can calculate their own cumulative risk of triggering an avalanche given their own
guesstimates. We make that R-code available for download on researchgate and personal
websites.
1
2 An alternative way to calculate the the cumulative risk
of triggering an avalanche
The probability of experiencing at least one avalanche in n slope crossings is given by
1   P (X = 0) = 1   (1   p)n, where X ⇠ Bin(n, p) is a binomially-distributed random
variable representing the number of avalanches experienced in n crossings, and p is the
probability that a single crossing results in an avalanche.
The probability p depends on the competence of the decision maker and the riskiness
of the environment. For an avalanche to be triggered, two events need to happen –
the slope must be predisposed to avalanche, in the sense that if it is crossed, it will
avalanche; and the skiier must choose to cross the slope. Defining these events as G
and A respectively, the joint probability that a single crossing results in an avalanche
p = P (G \ A) = P (G|A)P (A) = ⇣↵, where ⇣ = P (G|A) is a natural (inverse) measure of
competence and ↵ = P (A) measures the riskiness of the crossing. Thus, a choice of values
for ⇣, ↵, and n leads directly to an estimate for the probability of being avalanched in n
crossings.
Realistically, neither the background risk parameter ↵ nor the decision-making param-
eter ⇣ will be constant over time. Skiiers cross slopes of varying riskiness and also learn
or unlearn over time. Our probability model can easily be adapted for this by defining
blocks of crossings in which these parameters are constant. Then the probability of being
avalanched in n crossings is 1 QBb=1Qnbi=1(1  ↵b⇣b) where nb is the number of crossings
made in block b, and ↵b and ⇣b are the risk and decision parameters in that block.
To calculate how confident a skiier should be in his/her competence given the trig-
gering of an avalanche, we make use of Bayes’ theorem. Let C denote that one is a
competent decision-maker, and Ln denote an experience of at least one avalanche after n
slope crossings. Then Bayes’ theorem stipulates that the probability that one is a compe-
tent decision-maker given an avalanche event is P (C|Ln) = P (Ln|C)P (C)/P (Ln) where
P (Ln) = P (Ln|C)P (C)+P (Ln|C)P (C). The probabilities P (Ln|C) and P (Ln|C) can be
obtained from our model by choosing appropriate values for ⇣. Values for P (C|Ln) can
be computed similarly. Our estimates of cumulative risk are based on n = 1500 crossings,
with ↵ = 1/10000 and ⇣ = 0.25 and 0.46 for competent and untrained skiiers respectively.
2
3 New R-code
Please consult the additional material on researchgate to download the R-code. An image
of the code can be found below:
3
